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The aim of this study is to search for a 
mechanism for implementing large invest-
ment projects of crucial economic impor-
tance in the modern economic conditions 
characterized by the sanction policy of for-
eign states, limited public investment, and a 
mass exodus of foreign investors. 
An example of a large-scale investment 
project is the construction of a multipur-
pose multimodal complex — the commer-
cial seaport of Ust-Luga. This is one of the 
most recent large projects in seaport infra-
structure development. 
This article estimates the project’s sig-
nificance for the development of the Baltic 
region and presents a competitive analysis 
of the seaport position in comparison to the 
largest European ports. 
The authors analyze the strengths of 
the seaport construction project, namely, 
the favorable natural environment and cli-
mate, advantageous geographical position, 
strong political will demonstrated by the 
federal and regional authorities. The arti-
cle also considers the challenges the pro-
ject faces — unfortunate geopolitical situa-
tion, growing competition from other sea-
ports, and lack of investment. 
Based on the analysis of challenges, it 
is concluded that there are significant risks 
associated predominantly with lack of in-
vestment. 
In these conditions, a large investment 
project requires the enhancement of public-
private partnership, which will ensure the 
timely implementation of such projects. 
 
Key words: large-scale investment pro-
ject, commercial seaport, Ust-Luga, risks, 
investment, public-private partnership, 
public private partnership 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the face of geopolitical risks, an 
increase in the competitiveness of Rus-
sian economy requires accelerated 
modernisation and further development 
of seaport infrastructure as an impor-
tant element of the transport system. 
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Seaports are a key element of the national transport system. They en-
sure connections between different modes of transport. Seaports account 
for over 80% of Russia’s international trade, and support the country’s 
economic ties with approximately 100 countries of the world [2]. How-
ever, the current level of seaport infrastructure does not meet the national 
cargo traffic needs. This is evidenced by the fact that, in 1990-2013, total 
international trade increased 8.8-fold, whereas maritime traffic reduced 
6.6-fold. As a result, the proportion of ship transport in the national cargo 
traffic decreased threefold (table 1). 
 
Table 1 
 
Changes in Russia’s international trade  
and marine transportation in 1990—2013 
 
Parameter 1990  2000 2005 2010 2013 
Total international trade, 
USD billion 95.6 149.9 368.9 648.9 844.0 
Maritime cargo traffic, million 
tons 112 35 26 37 17 
Proportion of ship transport in 
the total cargo traffic, % 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2 
 
One of the promising areas for maritime trade development is the 
Baltic region — the national cargo traffic leader [14]. As of 2013, it ac-
counted for 36% of the total cargo traffic handled by the country’s sea-
ports [5]. 
To secure leadership in increasing competition from both European 
ports and the Baltics, it is important to develop the commercial seaport of 
Ust-Luga as a multifunctional facility using advanced innovative tech-
nologies. The region’s existing seaports have almost exhausted their ca-
pacity to develop. Moreover, all of them (excluding the seaport of Ka-
liningrad) are ‘freezing’ shallow-water ports, which imposes limitations 
on their operation [11]. 
This study aims to assess possibilities of and obstacles to the imple-
mentation of the Ust-Luga project as well as to identify a relevant im-
plementation mechanism in the new economic conditions, which can be 
considered as threats. 
The port of Ust-Luga, now at the construction stage, will include 20 han-
dling terminals with a maximum capacity of 180 million tons per year 
[1]. This will result in the creation of a large industrial and logistics clus-
ter, i. e. the port will operate as a multimodal facility. 
Despite the continuing construction, the port can handle any high-ca-
pacity tankers and ocean vessels of any types. 
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1. Assessment of the international competitive environment  
of the seaport of Ust-Luga 
 
The international competitive environment of the port of Ust-Luga pro-
ject is affected by the following factors [9; 15]: 
1) increasing globalisation of economic ties between countries and ex-
pansion of international connections; 
2) a high development level of European economies and their broad 
economic ties supported by maritime cargo and passenger traffic; 
3) an intersection between the trade routes of Russia, the Baltics and 
Western Europe, a comparable level of services; 
4) promotion of international trade between European countries and 
Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Japan; 
5)  a high level of sea infrastructure development in the Baltics and Eu-
rope ensured by hi-tech equipment, qualified staff, and favourable envi-
ronmental conditions (ice-free and deep-water ports); 
6) increasing competition in cargo and passenger traffic between the 
Baltic and North Sea ports. 
The development of the commercial seaport of Ust-Luga is challenged 
by larges ports of Europe and the Baltics [12]. 
Major competitors are the seaports of Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Ham-
burg, whose key competitive advantages are as follows: 
 advantageous geographical location; 
 favourable topography and climate; 
 centuries of experience; 
 modern cargo handling technology; 
 high capacities and a developed infrastructure; 
 high quality of services; 
 cargo handling specialisation; 
 status of world leaders in cargo transportation; 
 commitment to an increase in cargo traffic. 
However, even if the design capacity of the seaport of Ust-Luga is 
achieved, it will not be able to compete with the largest European seaports, 
whose competitive advantages stem from environmental and climatic fac-
tors, such as advantageous location, ice-free waters, and established tradi-
tions. Moreover, largest European seaports have a developed infrastructure 
and considerable cargo handling capacities, which make it possible to create 
a system of seaport hubs. European seaports are complex infrastructure ob-
jects, whose key elements are ship, rail, and motor transport, developed lo-
gistics, and diversified production. 
A different situation is observed in the Baltics — Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. The seaports of these former Soviet republics were developed as the 
Baltic ‘sea gate’ of the USSR. After the demise of the USSR, the following 
Baltic seaports became major competitors to Russian ports as well as the 
commercial seaports of the Baltic region) [23]: 
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1. the port of Klaipeda (Lithuania). 
2. the port Ventspils (Latvia). 
3. the port of Riga (Latvia). 
4. the port of Tallinn (Estonia). 
In 2000-2013, the total cargo traffic of these ports grew from 97 to 
132 million tons — a 2.7-fold increase was observed in Riga and a 1.9-
fold increase in Klaipeda. The cargo traffic in the Tallinn seaport did 
not change significantly and that in Ventspils dropped by 18%. The 
Baltic leaders in cargo traffic changed over this period. In 2000, the top 
ports were those of Tallinn and Ventspils, whereas in 2013, they were 
replaced by Klaipeda и Riga. Despite the leading position in cargo traf-
fic, the Riga port is used to only 77% of its capacity and the Klaipeda 
port to 78% [5; 18]. 
To accelerate the development of large seaports, some of them were as-
signed the status of ‘a free economic zone’ (FAZ), for instance, the Latvian 
ports of Ventspils and Riga. 
The FAZ status suggests that companies are not taxed on the port terri-
tory. Investors operating from a ‘free port’ are granted the status of a li-
cenced company associated with direct and indirect tax privileges. This re-
lates to income tax (an 80-100% concession), real estate tax, VAT, excise 
tax, and customs duties (up to 100% off). 
Another promising area of seaport development in the Baltics is cre-
ating large logistics centres. The port of Ust-Luga takes into account all 
factors ensuring its competitiveness with other national and interna-
tional ports [24]. This relates to both technical equipment and economic 
incentives. As a result, the port of Ust-Luga already poses serious com-
petition to the Baltic seaports. In the future, this gap will only increase 
(table 2). 
 
Table 2 
 
Correlation of the cargo traffic at the seaport of Ust-Luga  
and the largest ports of the Baltics, % 
 
Seaport 
of the Baltic 
Cargo traffic  
at the port of Ust-Luga  
to the 2013 cargo traffic,  
actual numbers 
Cargo traffic  
at the port of Ust-Luga  
to the 2030 cargo traffic,  
forecast 
Riga 170.0 360.0 
Klaipeda 172.5 375.8 
Ventspils 208.9 428.5 
Tallinn 230.9 529.4 
 
The seaport of Ust-Luga demonstrates serious competitive advantages 
and has the potential to become the largest port on the Baltic Sea. 
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2. Opportunities for and obstacles to the development  
of the commercial seaport of Ust-Luga 
 
The seaport of Ust-Luga has a number of clear competitive advantages. 
First, it is conveniently located in the Gulf of Finland close to the EU-Russia 
border and at a significant distance from Saint Petersburg with its heavy traffic. 
This port ensures direct access to European consumers, which has a beneficial 
effect on the development of the regional and national economy [21]. It is im-
portant to note its vicinity to the country’s major industrially developed regions 
and centres of imported cargo consumption. These factors reduce transportation 
costs. Another competitive advantage of the port of Ust-Luga is its favourable 
navigational conditions. The port located in the Gulf of Finland, which does not 
freeze even at the lowest temperatures, can be exploited throughout the year. 
The ice flood period is approximately 40 days. Icebreakers are used only at the 
lowest temperatures. Usually, navigation in the canal is maintained by an ice-
breaking tugboat. 
Other important features are the port’s deep waters (17.5 m) and a short 
approach canal (3.7 km), which makes Ust-Luga the only Russian port on 
the Baltic Sea that can accommodate ships of up to 160,000-ton deadweight. 
The other approach canal ensures roundabout traffic, reducing waiting time 
at anchorage. A strong competitive advantage of the seaport of Ust-Luga is 
its multifunctionality. Eighteen terminals are operating at the port, including 
several reshipping terminals, storage facilities, a rail and motor ferry com-
munication, and a container terminal. The port’s terminals provide reship-
ping and processing services for over 20 cargo categories. The ports modern 
technological equipment makes it possible to hand different categories of 
cargo and meet competitive deadlines. Moreover, it is planned to construct at 
least five more terminals. In 2018, when all designed terminals are put into 
operation, the port’s capacity will reach 180 million tons — the level of top 
three European ports. 
Another competitive advantage is the port’s own vessels granting addi-
tional functional opportunities and ensuring autonomous operation. The port 
boasts tugboats including ocean-class tugs. It is also planned to purchase and 
build specialised port vessels. An important advantage of the port of Ust-
Luga is cargo traffic bypassing the overloaded Saint Petersburg transport 
node. Construction works are accompanied by infrastructure development. 
The Ministry of Transport and Russian Railways support the reconstruction 
of external approaches, motorways, and railways connecting the port of Ust-
Luga with major transport routes. 
However, despite the advantages bringing the port of Ust-Luga closer to 
the status of the largest port on the Baltic Sea, special attention should be 
paid to weaknesses and obstacles to development [8]. 
Major factor hampering the port’s development and reducing its com-
petitive advantages are as follows: 
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1) the inability of the motorway infrastructure to accommodate the in-
creasing cargo traffic. Despite the reconstruction of the existing roads and 
construction of new owns, the motorways remain overloaded. Poor transport 
infrastructure poses an obstacle to the launch of new terminals and an in-
crease in cargo traffic at the existing one; 
2) distortion of the ecosystem and environmental pollution in the 
seaport area. The Baltic Sea’s marine ecosystem is very sensitive. Over 
the past decades, marine pollution has become an increasingly serious 
problem, one of the reasons behind it being the Ust-Luga construction. 
The most dangerous environmental threats posed by the seaport opera-
tions include: 
— eutrophication caused by the excess of nutrients — nitrogen and 
phosphorus — at the sea floor; 
— pollution by hazardous substances, including pesticides, heavy 
metals, industrial substances, chlorinated paraffins, and random side 
products such as dioxides; 
— destruction of the habitats of marine flora and fauna; 
— oil spills. 
3) substandard accommodation for the port employees and construction 
workers. The first new residential districts of the new town of Ust-Luga are 
under construction. However, the problem of accommodating employees and 
construction workers remains rather acute. The proportion of comfortable 
accommodation in the village of Ust-Luga is rather low.  
4) a rigid tariff policy. As experts stress, the success of the seaport of 
Ust-Luga rests on the fact that investors in the port terminals are also cargo 
shippers. Therefore, they will be interested in shipping cargoes from their 
facilities. The other cargo traffic will not abandon its regular routes if the 
Ust-Luga investors do not offer lower prices; 
5) a high probability of deviations from the balanced and rational use of 
funds allocated for the port infrastructure development. The Ust-Luga con-
struction and development project is based on the private-public partnership 
principles. Coordinating the efforts of numerous project participants — 
which often have different interests — is a rather challenging management 
problem. 
Alongside internal limitations, there are also external factors and threats 
that can have an adverse effect on the development and competitiveness of 
the port of Ust-Luga. 
First, it is the deteriorating external and internal economic situation, 
which can slow down the rate of increase in cargo traffic. A critical factor 
for the development of Russian seaports is world energy price and the price 
of non-ferrous metals, since non-ferrous metals account for the major part of 
Russian cargo traffic in the region. 
Moreover, the current economic crisis can have an adverse effect on the 
seaport development rates — investment in the infrastructure decreases, the 
deadlines for new port facilities are not met, and it becomes increasingly dif-
ficult to attract foreign investors.  
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To a great degree, these obstacles determine the risks associated with the 
Ust-Luga construction project. 
 
3. Risks associated with the construction of the seaport of Ust-Luga 
 
High risks associated with the Ust-Luga construction project are ac-
counted for by many factors, namely, the project’s complexity, high project 
costs (approximately 700 billion roubles as estimated by VEB [20]), a large 
number of partners, unpredictable geopolitical situation, etc. 
When analysing the risks, it is important to identify the external and in-
ternal risks associated with the construction of the seaport of Ust-Luga as a 
multimodal facility. 
According to the Strategy for the Development of Seaport Infrastructure in 
Russia until 2030, external risks relate to environmental conditions, macro-
economic situation, and foreign policies of states (including new rules of in-
ternational law) and thus cannot be influenced by the Russian Federation [1]. 
Internal risks relate to production, investment, and commercial activities 
and emerge in the course of the company’s operation [19]. 
The internal and external risk parameters are presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3 
 
External and internal risks associated with the seaport of Ust-Luga project 
 
External risks Internal risks 
Macroeconomic risks: 
 deteriorating situation in the sales 
markets; 
 sanctions against Russia and reciprocal 
sanctions against western European 
countries; 
 decreasing economic growth rates and 
a decline in raw materials demand; 
 emergence of ‘hotspots’ hindering 
commercial operations. 
Financial risks: 
 liquidity risk — a company may ex-
perience problems with meeting finan-
cial liabilities; 
 credit risk — financial losses relating to 
the customer’s or counteragent’s failure to 
meet contractual obligations; 
 lack of investment 
Industry-related risks: 
 competition among seaports ; 
 poorly developed transport infrastruc-
ture (railways and motorways); 
 poorly developed logistics; 
 imperfect tariff policy 
Market risks: 
 exchange risks relating to sales, pur-
chases and loans in foreign currency 
(EUR and USD); 
 interest risk relating to changes in the 
Central Bank’s key interest rate and 
more expensive borrowing 
Investment risks: 
 unfavourable investment climate in the 
country and in the world; 
 a lack or insufficient number of anchor 
investors; 
 reduction in public funding due to de-
teriorating economic situation
Infrastructure risks: 
 limitations on port structure develop-
ment; 
 insufficient cargo capacities; 
 a lack of developed infrastructure, poor 
equipment of cargo checkpoints at the 
border
Economic and geographical development of the Russian Northwest 
 
 76 
The end of the table 3 
 
External risks Internal risks 
Legislative risks: 
 absence of governmental guarantees to 
investors; 
 absence of laws on seaport infrastruc-
ture development; 
 absence of a law on the special eco-
nomic zone in the port; 
 imperfect tariff policy; 
 ineffective regulation of the legal as-
pects of private-public partnership in the 
framework of  investment activities 
HR risks: 
 lack of qualified personnel for the port 
facility construction; 
 lack of construction workers for build-
ing the port’s transport and logistics fa-
cilities; 
 using a personnel rotation system to 
staff the construction works 
Environmental risks: 
 construction of hazardous production 
terminals; 
 inefficient industrial waste treatment; 
 delayed construction of the waste 
treatment facilities 
Partner relationship risks: 
 failure to fulfil obligations; 
 uncoordinated efforts; 
 delayed financing; 
 withdrawal of financing 
 
As table 3 shows, the key risks to the implementation of the strategy for 
the port of Ust-Luga construction are external. The project’s global nature 
makes it sensitive to numerous factors beyond its scope; there are geopoliti-
cal risks, as well as risks relating to the imperfect Russian legislation and in-
vestment risks stemming from the unfavourable economic situation in the 
country and the world in whole. 
However, one should not underestimate the effect of the internal risks, 
namely: 
1) the risk of insufficient investment (a financial riks)  
2) infrastructure risks; 
3) HR risks; 
4) partnership risks. 
Risk factors cause delays in putting infrastructure objects into operation, 
which complicates the seaport’s functioning. 
Risks delay the date of reaching the port’s full capacity, increase con-
struction costs, diminish project development intensity, reduce the project’s 
scales, and make investors abandon the project. 
Since most external risks are beyond the existing management opportunities, 
it is important to focus on reducing the negative effect of the internal risks. 
This requires a classification of the internal risks by the degree of im-
pact. There are risks that have insignificant, significant, and catastrophic ef-
fect on the project implementation (table 4). 
Today, a developed port infrastructure is the key objective of the port of 
Ust-Luga project [18]. If this objective is not attained due to either a lack of 
qualified personal or investment or uncoordinated actions of partners, conse-
quences can be critical. 
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Table 4 
 
Classification of internal risks to  
the seaport of Ust-Luga construction project by degree of impact  
 
Insignificant risks Moderate risks Critical risks 
Liquidity Credit HR 
Interest rate Exchange Partnership relations 
Uncoordinated actions of 
partners 
Infrastructure  Lack of investment 
 
Critical risks are an immediate warning first to investors and then to cus-
tomers. Therefore, identifying and minimising such risks is a key managerial 
objective of the port of Ust-Luga development [10]. 
To minimise the risks related to the construction and development of the 
seaport of Ust-Luga, it is important to launch initiatives aimed to prevent 
possible catastrophic consequences (see table 5). 
 
Table 5 
 
Initiatives aimed to minimise internal risks to the seaport  
of Ust-Luga construction 
 
Risks Risk management initiatives 
Partners’ uncoor-
dinated actions 
1. Concluding partnership agreements  
2. Risk hedging 
Credit 1. Public support for project implementation  
2. Rationing  
3. Attracting new (also private) investors  
4. Concluding agreements of financial liabilities based on PPP 
guarantees 
Infrastructure 1. Diversification in infrastructure project implementation 
2. Risk insurance
Human resources 1. Rapid construction of a town for construction workers and the 
port’s personnel 
2. Concluding agreements on personnel training with the major uni-
versities of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region 
3. Gradual abandonment of rotational system  
Partner relations 1. Risk insurance 
2. Risk profile 
Investment re-
source  
1. Wide application of the PPP mechanism  
2. Attracting foreign investment  
3. Developing comprehensive programmes for seaport territory 
development 
 
Therefore, initiatives aimed to minimise internal risks to the develop-
ment of the seaport of Ust-Luga are complex and cost-intensive. These long-
term initiatives require coordinated actions of public and private investors. 
Moreover, risk reduction ensures that the port of Ust-Luga is put into opera-
tion within the expected period. 
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4. Private-public partnership as a mechanism to implement  
the seaport of Ust-Luga project 
 
Against the background of insufficient investment, the possibility of 
partners’ uncoordinated actions, and the need to meet project deadlines, 
PPP mechanisms are an effective way to solve these problems [17; 22]. 
In a broad sense, PPP is an institutional and organisational alliance be-
tween the state and private business aimed to implement socially significant 
projects [6]. 
In this study, PPP is interpreted as legally formalised, voluntary, public, and 
mutually beneficial cooperation between the state and private business that is 
based on combining resources, ascertaining the rights and obligations, distrib-
uting earlier identified risk proportions and results aimed at the efficient imple-
mentation of projects of considerable socioeconomic significance. 
Since PPP means mutually beneficial cooperation between the state and a 
private investor, participation in the seaport of Ust-Luga project is associated 
with a number of benefits, namely [10; 15]: 
 minimisation of public contribution, 
 increase in the project’s economic and fiscal efficiency through private 
participation;  
 accelerated project implementation; 
 reduction in public expenditure on infrastructure construction and 
maintenance; 
 cost-effective project management through transferring functions to a 
private investor; 
 introducing modern technology. 
For a private investor, participation in the seaport construction is benefi-
cial due to [3; 4]: 
 opportunities to enjoy direct public support; 
 risk sharing; 
 opportunities for long-term investment against public guarantees; 
 minimum income guarantee. 
The most effective PPP form for implementing a large infrastructure pro-
ject is concessions, in the framework of which the private partner (con-
cessioner), participating in creating or modernising an infrastructure object, 
obtains operating control over the object in order to return investment and 
generate profit [7]. A concessional agreement is concluded for a long-term 
period, which makes strategic planning possible for both parties. During the 
agreement period, the private party enjoys absolute power to make any man-
agerial decisions. The state has all the necessary mechanisms to influence 
private partners in order to protect public interests. 
Depending on the authority delegated to the private partner, investment 
liabilities of the parties, principles of risk sharing, and responsibility of the 
parties for different types of works, different concession mechanisms can be 
used within PPP projects for the seaport of Ust-Luga development [25; 26] 
(table 6). 
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Table 6 
 
PPP concession mechanisms for the the seaport  
of Ust-Luga construction 
 
Mechanism Description 
BOT (build — operate — 
transfer)  
The private investor builds and uses a new facility under a 
long-term concessional agreement at their own expense 
and risk. The investor retains all revenues generated by the 
project and bears investment and operational costs. Upon 
the termination of the agreement, the facility is transferred 
to the public sector. 
 DBFO (design — build 
— finance — operate)  
The private investor assumes the responsibility for de-
signing, financing, building, and operating the facility 
under the concessional agreement. Upon its termination, 
the object is transferred to the public sector.  
BOOT (build — own — 
operate — transfer) 
The private investor builds, operates, and owns the facil-
ity during the concession period. Then, the facility is 
transferred to the government. 
BOO (build — own — 
operate)  
The private investor builds the facility and retains owner-
ship of the facility in perpetuity. 
ВТО (build — transfer — 
operate) 
 
The private investor builds the facility and transfers it to 
the public sector. The object is operated by the private in-
vestor to receive return on investment and generate profit 
after the transfer to the government. This mechanism sug-
gests direct public control over the concession object. The 
state has significant influence on the decisions and actions 
of the concession holder. 
 
Despite the partial employment of this mechanism in the construction of 
the port of Ust-Luga, it has to be applied more extensively through using 
such forms of concession as BOT, BOOT, BOO. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The analysis of strengths, weaknesses, and implementation mechanisms 
of a large-scale project — namely, the seaport of Ust-Luga — in the new 
economic conditions demonstrates the following: 
1) the difficult geopolitical situation, internal problems of Russia’s eco-
nomic development, increasing uncertainty, and lack of investment compli-
cate the implementation of large-scale investment projects; 
2) major risks relate to a lack of investment and the insufficient number 
of anchor investors. In the case of the Ust-Luga project, this is manifested in 
expired deadlines for transport infrastructure and insufficient human re-
sources, since the problem of financing the construction of a town for con-
struction specialists and future port employees has not been solved yet; 
3) against the background of foreign capital exodus, special attention 
should be paid to private-public partnership. Its most effective form is con-
cession, which suggests considerable interest from private investors; 
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4) when choosing the concession form for the Ust-Luga project, it is 
important to consider BOT, BOOT, BOO, and other arrangements, which 
will make it possible to find the most efficient PPP mechanism; 
5) the implementation of large investment projects using the PPP 
mechanism requires a number of legal, administrative, financial, and eco-
nomic initiatives aimed to create favourable investment conditions. Special 
attention should be paid to the perfection of the existing legislation to make 
it possible for partners to protect their interests in a dispute. There is also a 
need to develop tax exemption, credit relaxation, and lease subsidy mecha-
nisms for participants of large-scale investment projects.  
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